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Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform
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I. INTRODUCTION
How can law be a mechanism for police reform? The most familiar
answer, for legal scholars who work on the regulation of law enforce-
ment, is as a deterrent: the law sets some limit on police behavior and
imposes some sanction for violations. Two examples that fit neatly
within the deterrence model are civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides a cause of action for constitutional torts by state
officials acting under the color of law, and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1 which provides the fed-
eral analog. The exclusionary rule, which judges invoke to suppress ille-
gally obtained evidence, is authorized, at least in its modern incarnation,
only because of its ability to deter police officers from engaging in con-
stitutional misconduct.2 Both civil liability and the exclusionary rule are
tremendously important, and both have been the object of penetrating
academic analyses and critiques penned by any number of courts and
commentators. But neither they nor the deterrent model more generally
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina Law School. I am indebted to Seth
Davis; Sharon Jacobs; Erik Lilliquist; Colin Miller; Susannah Barton Tobin; as well as my co-
panelists at the University of Miami Law Review’s Leading from Below Symposium, Judge John
Gleeson and Judge Kathleen William; and the many participants of the 2014 CrimFest Conference
who offered incisive questions and helpful comments. I am thankful for the research assistance of
Meghan Cleary and Neha Jaganathan and for the editing work of the University of Miami Law
Review. As always, I am deeply grateful for the support of Alisa Stoughton.
1. 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971).
2. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 875–76 (2014).
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are the only methods through which the law can affect police behaviors.3
Building on prior work in which I explored laws that have an inci-
dental regulatory effect on police practices and officer behavior,4 this
article discusses the potential for evidentiary considerations to change
both police training and agency culture. The underlying concept grew
out of a symposium, titled Leading from Below, hosted by the University
of Miami Law Review in February 2014, which explored the real-world
influence of district court judges’ authority and discretion. In my portion
of the event, I framed my comments as an attempt to identify the inter-
section of trial court judges and police officers. Officers provide infor-
mation to, and in, court. They offer their observations and conclusions in
support of arrest and search warrant applications. They are witnesses in
suppression hearings, probation and parole hearings, and depositions.
And, of course, they testify in the civil and criminal cases that go to trial.
They are, in short, subject to evidentiary rulings.
Can evidentiary considerations play a role in reforming police
behavior? In this article, I offer an optimistic, though not unqualified,
conclusion: yes. In Part II, I demonstrate how evidentiary considerations
have shaped not just police behavior but also the culture of policing
itself. Cultural change is a critical component of meaningful police
reform; one who seeks to change some aspect of policing must take into
account the role of culture in shaping the objectionable behavior. For
example, two much-discussed aspects of modern policing—the adoption
of vehicle-based patrol as a replacement for foot patrol and the transition
of police departments from social service organizations to dedicated
crime-fighting agencies5—are resistant to modification because they are
the result of changes to the very culture of law enforcement. But police
culture is neither independently organic nor develops in a vacuum. The
3. In recent years, scholars interested in police reform have gone well beyond expanding on
the deterrent model, turning instead to other forms of legal regulation, such as structural reform
litigation. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 351
(2011); Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2009).
4. Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2181
(2014).
5. In the 1870s, for example, the then-twenty year old Boston Police Department had
established soup kitchens and homeless shelters and was providing shoes and medicine to the
poor. DONNA M. WELLS, BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 12 (2003). This model of policing would
be anathema to many officers and police administrators today, who have no interest in diluting
their occupational self-perception by becoming “social workers with guns.” HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL LEGAL POLICY 403 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 2000); Michael E. Buerger, Policing and
Research: Two Cultures Separated by an Almost-Common Language, 11 POLICE PRAC. & RES.:
INT’L J. 135, 136 (2010) (“For all that police officers claim that ‘We are not social workers with
guns,’ they are.”).
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development of a police culture depends, in large part, on external fac-
tors including the legal rules in which the culture develops.6 Here, I
focus on three examples of how the culture and practices of law enforce-
ment have been shaped by different evidentiary considerations. The
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,7 first loudly denounced by
politicians and police administrators alike, have become a symbol of
police professionalism, even for the minority of law enforcement admin-
istrators who would get rid of the warnings altogether. Similarly, the
perceived need to maintain an unbroken chain of custody for evidence
has led police agencies to take great pride and to invest millions of dol-
lars in state-of-the-art property storage and evidence tracking facilities.
Finally, the popular enthusiasm for forensic investigations has changed
the police culture, which has seen the previously unknown and often
unappreciated “crime scene technicians,” responsible for collecting and,
to some extent, analyzing evidence, morph into highly professional
“forensic scientists.”
In Part III, I explore the possibility of using evidentiary rulings to
further advance reform, focusing on the use of officers’ opinion testi-
mony. Police testimony often straddles the line between lay and expert
testimony. Officers routinely testify not just to their personal observa-
tions, but also to offer conclusions that they base on their training and
experience. Police officers testify on a range of topics that include
indicators of suspicion and criminality, police practices, and community
norms. They identify neighborhoods as high-crime areas, recognize
hand-to-hand drug transactions, describe when deadly force is an appro-
priate response, articulate the modus operandi of narcotics traffickers,
explain why a particular set of circumstances aroused reasonable suspi-
cion, and translate coded language recorded in a wiretapped phone
call—and that is just the start.
Each of these examples, and any number of others, requires special-
ized knowledge, experience, or training. Unfortunately, under the
existing evidentiary framework, police officer testimony is frequently
admitted in a way that blurs the already muddy line that separates lay
and expert testimony, leading to three distinct problems. First, an officer
may provide what is undeniably lay testimony, but using language that
indicates a particular expertise. Dressing a lay opinion in the robes of
expertise risks artificially altering the fact-finder’s determination of
credibility, presenting the officer as more knowledgeable, and thus more
credible, than the rules of evidence would suggest or permit. Second, an
officer may offer, or a prosecutor may solicit, expert testimony dressed
6. Stoughton, supra note 4, at 2181.
7. 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
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in the guise of a lay opinion. Here, the error is in allowing evidence that
has not gone through the reliability screening that the rules governing
expert testimony require, effectively risking the admission of a “bad”
expert opinion. Finally, and most importantly for the ultimate thesis of
this article, an officer’s statements, even when he speaks as an expert,
may lack the reliability that expert testimony is supposed to demon-
strate. An expert’s opinion is often based on information that is not, and
which could not be, admitted into evidence; therefore, the rules of evi-
dence require expert testimony to be especially reliable. But police train-
ing, unlike scientific or academic training, is often informal, based on
anecdotes and the collective knowledge of the law enforcement commu-
nity rather than on any particular methodology or approach to analysis.
Because they have not been put through the rigor that we expect in other
disciplines, an officer’s expert conclusions and opinions may lack the
foundation upon which their authority should be built. I argue in Part III
that an evidentiary framework that requires a more searching analysis of
the reliability of officer opinion testimony could lead to a change in
police training that could, in turn, change police culture for the better.
In Part IV, I address several theoretical and practical concerns that
limit the potential of evidentiary considerations to serve as a mechanism
for police reform. I conclude that, while the impact of evidentiary con-
siderations is neither certain nor the appropriate way to address all
aspects of policing, it can be a useful addition to the broader conversa-
tion about police reform.
II. EVIDENCE AND POLICE PRACTICES
This section offers three examples in support of my thesis that
policing can be responsive to evidentiary developments: Miranda warn-
ings, authentication and chain of custody requirements, and forensic
investigation techniques. These are certainly not the only examples of
how evidentiary rulings affect policing, but they are intentionally chosen
for their diversity. From a formal constitutional requirement handed
down from the Supreme Court of the United States to a non-constitu-
tional evidentiary determination that is only rarely implicated beyond
the trial courts to the pressures of popular enthusiasm for a particular
investigatory tactic, these examples illustrate how evidentiary consider-
ations have shaped both police practices and the professional culture of
law enforcement.
A. Miranda Warnings and Police Interrogation
In 1966, the Supreme Court issued the most widely recognized
criminal procedure opinion in United States history: Miranda v. Ari-
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zona.8 A five-justice majority held that officers must provide a warning
before questioning any individual who “is taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom . . . in any significant way.”9 The ruling
was intended to create “procedural safeguards” that would shield the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.10 Grounded
implicitly in constitutional rights, Miranda was subject to sharp aca-
demic and popular debate.11 A Columbia Law Review article published
shortly after Miranda was decided refers to “the image[s] of indignant
burglars demanding to be warned of their rights and provided with an
attorney [that] have found their way into public concern, political
speeches, and the cartoons of popular periodicals.”12 On the one hand
were concerns, reflected in Justice Clark’s dissent, that imposing such
stringent requirements “at the nerve center of crime detection may well
kill the patient” by substantially burdening law enforcement operations
and aiding criminals.13 On the other hand was the belief that the
Miranda warnings were inadequate as a protective mechanism, largely
because the Court neither provided meaningful definitions for critical
concepts, such as “custody” and “waiver,” nor took into account police
gamesmanship that some scholars and practitioners thought inevitable.14
The Court later clarified many of the questions that it had left open in
Miranda,15 and more modern critiques have focused on the effect of
Miranda on the criminal justice system,16 the high rate at which suspects
8. Id. As the Supreme Court itself recognized, “Miranda has become embedded in routine
police practices to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000). See also Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s
Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 259 & n.1
(1996).
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda
v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 645 (1967); Thomas S. Schrock et al., Interrogational Rights:
Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1978).
12. Elsen & Rosett, supra note 11, at 645.
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 500; Leo, supra note 8, at 260.
14. Elsen & Rosett, supra note 11, at 660–64.
15. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) (holding that traffic stops are not
custodial for Miranda purposes); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326–27 (1994) (holding
that officer intent is irrelevant to the custody determination); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301–04 (1980) (holding that Miranda warnings are required before police engage in behavior that
they should know is reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information); Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (holding that Miranda does not apply when the suspect is unaware that he is
speaking to a police officer).
16. Perhaps the most notable debate about Miranda was between Stephen Schulhofer, who
argued that Miranda had no measurable impact on conviction rates, and Paul Cassell and Richard
Fowles, who conclude that Miranda imposes significant social costs. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 500 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
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waive their rights,17 the gradual erosion of the doctrine,18 and the use of
police tactics that reduce the value of the Miranda protections.19
As it played out, Miranda contributed to police reform in both
obvious and subtle ways. The most obvious, of course, is the reading of
the Miranda warnings themselves. Today, police departments typically
provide plastic or laminated “Miranda Warning” cards that officers can
carry with them and read from. Many police departments “recommend
or require that . . . [the warnings] be read verbatim from the printed
card.”20 And many officers do just that, ensuring that the Miranda
requirements are satisfied,21 even though the Supreme Court has held
that a precise recitation of the warnings using exactly the language from
the Miranda opinion is not necessary.22 The cards, commercially avail-
able from popular police supply retailers,23 are typically broken into two
sections. The majority of the card contains the Miranda warning itself,
often listed as five enumerated statements, while the bottom of the card
is a waiver section that prompts officers to ask whether the suspect
understands his rights and whether he is willing to speak to officers. For
illustrative purposes, I have included the image that accompanies the
listing of a $4 plastic “Miranda Card” sold by Streicher’s, one of the
most popular police supply retailers.24
17. Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 550 (“Suspects under interrogation are routinely asked to
‘waive’ their Fifth Amendment privilege and many do so.”).
18. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–25 (2010) (examining the “gradual overruling” of
Miranda).
19. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 8 (describing a variety of tactics used in police interrogations
including “qualifying the suspect,” by determining their “suggestibility, deference, and
cooperativeness,” and “conning the suspect” into eliciting a confession through “confidence
games”); Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics Chipping Away at Suspects’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/nyregion/police-tactics-chipping-away-at-suspects-
rights.html.
20. CHARLES R. SWANSON ET AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 181–82 (7th ed. 2000).
21. KÄREN MATISON HESS ET AL., POLICE OPERATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 61 (6th ed.
2014).
22. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201–03 (1989) (holding that a misstatement of the
Miranda warnings does not render those warnings inadequate nor are any subsequent statements
made by the defendant rendered inadmissible so long as an effectively equivalent warning was
given).
23. Miranda Card, STREICHER’S, http://www.policehq.com/Products/KC-1 (last visited Oct.
29, 2014); Miranda Warning Card, HANDCUFF WAREHOUSE, http://www.handcuffwarehouse.com/
Miranda-Warning-Card.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014); Geiger Miranda Warning Card, CHIEF,
http://www.chiefsupply.com/geiger-miranda-warning-card.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
24. Miranda Card, supra note 23.
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In addition to cards, officers can get the Miranda warning pre-
printed on pocket notebooks,25 via smart phone apps that can provide the
warnings in different languages,26 and on interview forms that the recipi-
ent of the warning can sign as acknowledgement that he received and
understood the warnings.
The laminated or plastic cards that officers can carry around and
read from are emblematic of Miranda’s most obvious effect: changing
police procedures. The more important effect, though, is also the more
subtle one: the alteration of police attitudes. When Miranda was
decided, the law enforcement community and hard-on-crime politicians
viewed it as a devastating blow that would hamper police operations and
endanger public safety.
[P]olice officials complained indignantly that Miranda would hand-
cuff their investigative abilities and significantly damage law
enforcement. Politicians linked Miranda to rising crime rates, as
Congress attempted legislation to invalidate Miranda in the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control Act . . . , [while] Richard Nixon declared
Miranda to be a victory of the “crime forces” over the “peace
forces.”27
25. Rite in the Rain All Weather Field Interview Notebook, Yellow, GALLS, http://
www.galls.com/rite-in-the-rain-all-weather-field-interview-notebook-yellow?PMSRCE=9235001
&SESSIONID=000000082440610 (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
26. POLICE IPHONE APPS, http://www.policeiphoneapps.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). This
translation feature could be an important tool. See United States v. Botello-Rosales, 728 F.3d 865,
867 (9th Cir. 2013) (overturning a conviction because of a police officer’s flawed translation of
Miranda warnings into Spanish).
27. Leo, supra note 8, at 260.
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Attitudes have changed significantly in the nearly half-century
since Miranda was decided. Surveys of police administrators suggest
that most now believe that the Miranda warning requirement does not
impose any meaningful burden on officers.28 Perhaps more tellingly,
most police executives do not believe that officers would change their
interrogation practices even if Miranda was overruled.29 In fact, a
majority of police executives view the Miranda warnings favorably and
support their continued use without regard for whether they are legally
required.30 This view is not universal, of course—the localized nature of
law enforcement precludes referring accurately to “the police” as if there
were some monolithic entity with consistent views—and some police
executives certainly favor repudiating the warning requirement.31 At
least so long as Miranda remains in effect, however, police executives
“almost universal[ly] disagree[ ]” with attempts to deliberately evade the
warning requirement.32 In short, even police administrators who would
prefer to abandon the Miranda warning requirement demand that their
officers comply with the rule until the Supreme Court tells them
otherwise.
For police, the warning requirement serves as a source of legiti-
macy in two ways. First, it is instructive, providing a “best practices”
approach that most police administrators believe officers could and
would continue to follow even in the absence of a constitutional require-
ment. In this way, the Miranda decision has changed police attitudes
about what constitutes professional policing in the context of interroga-
tion. Second, it serves as a conduct rule that tells officers how they must
act; police officers and executives—even those who disagree vehe-
mently with the underlying justifications for the warning—read the
Miranda warnings precisely because they are supposed to.33 I have writ-
28. Brian K. Payne et al., Police Chiefs’ and Students’ Attitudes About the Miranda Warnings,
34 J. CRIM. JUST. 653, 657–59 (2006). Regardless of police executives’ perceptions, whether
Miranda hinders police practices by increasing the rate at which suspects invoke their rights—
decreasing the rates at which they confess—remains a point of dispute in academic debates about
the practical effects of the Miranda decision. Compare Cassell & Fowles, supra note 16, with
Schulhofer, supra note 16.
29. Payne et al., supra note 28, at 657 (showing that approximately sixty percent of police
chiefs either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: “Abolishing the Miranda
warnings will change the way police officers do [things]”).
30. Victoria M. Time & Brian K. Payne, Police Chiefs’ Perceptions About Miranda: An
Analysis of Survey Data, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 77, 84 (2002); Brian K. Payne & Victoria M. Time,
Support for Miranda Among Police Chiefs: A Qualitative Examination, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 65,
74 (2000) [hereinafter Support for Miranda].
31. Support for Miranda, supra note 30, at 69–70.
32. Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward Miranda
and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 912 (2007) (concluding that
“police officials do not condone the outright flouting of Miranda’s warnings requirement”).
33. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and Social Control, 3 SOC. & LEGAL
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ten elsewhere about the deontological approach that police take with
respect to clear legal rules;34 as the Miranda warning requirement dem-
onstrates, this commitment to doing things the “right” way, even when it
is distasteful, is indicative of police professionalism.
B. Evidence Impoundment, Storage, and Tracking
An evidentiary rule need not be grounded in the Constitution to
affect police practices. The evidentiary requirement that may have the
most systemic impact on police operations is also one that goes largely
unmentioned in many evidence casebooks: the authentication or identifi-
cation requirement. To introduce evidence, the party seeking admission
must “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is
what the proponent claims it is.”35 In the context of criminal cases, pros-
ecutors must establish that the inculpatory evidence they want to have
admitted is what they claim it is (identifying a broken glass tube as a
crack pipe, for example), that it is relevant to the defendant’s trial
(explaining that it was the defendant’s crack pipe), and that it is in sub-
stantially the same condition as when it was seized (describing that the
crack cocaine residue was present at the time of arrest). “When the evi-
dence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to tampering or con-
tamination . . . the government must show a ‘chain of custody’ . . . with
sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.”36
Police officers serve as authenticators. The typical scenario, one
that plays out in courtrooms all over the country every day, involves a
prosecutor asking an officer if he recognizes a particular piece of evi-
dence. The officer indicates that he does—for example, “That is the bag-
gie of white powder that I retrieved from the glove box of the
defendant’s vehicle.” Further, the officer often explains how he is able to
identify a piece of evidence that he may not have thought about, let
alone seen, in the months since he arrested the defendant. The inability
to identify a piece of evidence—or, separately, the failure to establish
that a piece of evidence has probably not been tampered with in the
period between the original seizure and the request for admission—may
STUD. 93, 114–16 (1994). That officers can manipulate the situation or use deception and
psychological ploys during interrogations does not change that perception; rather than cutting
against Miranda’s professionalizing effect, those devices are permitted within the rule itself. The
professionalizing effect of Miranda was not entirely unanticipated, even shortly after the Supreme
Court issued the decision. See NEAL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT:
THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 203–04 (1971).
34. Stoughton, supra note 2, at 882 n.222.
35. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
36. United States v. Thomas, 749 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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result in the exclusion of evidence.37
Most police departments have taken significant pains to structure
their operations to ensure that a complete chain of custody exists for
each individual piece of evidence impounded by officers. Chain of cus-
tody records track each step a piece of evidence makes, from the time an
officer seizes it until it is admitted in court, but the procedures that
police agencies use to preserve the chain of custody for different pieces
of evidence can be more labyrinthine than any simple description sug-
gests. Departmental policies and procedures about impounding and
tracking evidence can fill lengthy tomes; the New York Police Depart-
ment’s Patrol Guide 218, the policy that governs seizure and processing
of evidence, covers 135 pages—more than eight percent of the 1,609
pages of what is intended to be a comprehensive policy manual for
patrol officers.38 These internal operating policies must incorporate state
laws that govern the disposal of property39 and mandatory record reten-
tion periods,40 and they are often supplemented with printed manuals
that instruct officers to package, store, and handle different pieces of
evidence in different ways.
Consider an entirely mundane scenario: a police officer arrests a
suspected drug dealer and seizes a small amount of marijuana, a few
baggies of cocaine, two rolls of cash, and a firearm. The seized items
must be documented, of course, but department policy may require that
they be recorded on separate forms, as each may take a very different
path from the scene of the arrest to the courtroom. The cocaine must be
weighed and will be packaged in a tamper-evident plastic bag, which is
either heat-sealed or closed with evidence tape. That plastic bag can be
stored in any secure evidence locker. The marijuana, on the other hand,
will be weighed and packaged in a paper bag to avoid degradation, such
as mold and decomposition, and the paper bag will be sealed with evi-
dence tape. Because the paper bag does not do much to contain the pun-
gent smell of marijuana, the police department may use a ventilated—or,
37. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Identification of Original, Real Evidence, 61
MIL. L. REV. 145 (1973) (describing the importance of properly identifying real evidence and
establishing a chain of custody for that evidence). The chain of custody requirement was once
much more stringent than it is today; the chain of custody need not be perfect for modern courts.
Today, so long as the chain of evidence is sufficiently complete, defects and gaps affect “the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 1310; see also Paul C.
Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 527,
527–28 (1983).
38. See generally NEW YORK POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE (effective Jan. 1, 2000).
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 705.105 (2014).
40. State “open records” laws often set minimum retention periods for public records,
including the records used to track evidence. Thus, even after a piece of evidence is introduced in
court, destroyed, auctioned off, or returned to its owner, the law enforcement agency must
maintain records relating to its custody of that evidence for some statutory period.
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in rare cases, a refrigerated—storage locker. At some point, both narcot-
ics will be sent to a crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and any
amount of the drug not used up in the analysis will be returned to evi-
dence storage.
After being unloaded, the firearm will be fastened into a cardboard
or plastic box with plastic self-gripping cable ties (better known as zip
ties) and the box sealed with tamper-evident tape before being put into a
“high liability” section of the storage facility. Unless ballistic testing is
required, the only analysis that the firearm will undergo is a check, using
the serial number, to determine whether it is stolen. Cash presents its
own problems; to prevent damning allegations of theft or corruption, the
seized cash will be counted independently by multiple officers—perhaps
by both an officer and a supervisor, depending on the amount—who
each sign an evidence receipt. The two rolls of cash will be counted and
recorded separately,41 and they may be subjected to a dog sniff or even
chemical analysis to support a forfeiture action. Each time any one of
the pieces of evidence changes hands—from the seizing officer to the
evidence technician to the driver who takes it to the lab to the series of
lab analysts who process it to the driver who brings it back to the police
department to the evidence technician who puts it back into storage to
the officer who brings it to court—the transfer must be documented on
an evidence receipt to preserve the chain of custody.42
The burdens in this system, which is described here in only the
most cursory fashion, are not insignificant—far from it. Each individual
officer must be trained to handle and impound many different kinds of
evidence. Large departments hire dedicated evidence technicians and
invest in digital inventory-management style tracking systems to deal
with the complexity of impounding and storing thousands or even mil-
lions of items simultaneously. Evidence must be securely stored, and the
storage facility must be both large enough to accommodate large items,
such as bicycles and household appliances, and diverse enough to handle
evidence with a variety of storage requirements, from biological material
that must be kept refrigerated to marijuana that should be ventilated to
vehicles that need to be kept indoors. Many smaller departments, indi-
vidually lacking evidence storage capacity, will make arrangements with
neighboring agencies to use their facilities.43 In toto, police agencies
41. Having money in different pockets is a common, if crude, accounting device that street-
level drug dealers are known to use to separate accounts receivable (the dealer’s money) and
accounts payable (money owed to the dealer’s supplier). See United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d
396, 401 (1991); Paul v. Carey, No. 05-cv-03460, 2007 WL 735769, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
42. THOMAS J. GARDNER & TERRY M. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: PRINCIPLES AND
CASES 439–40 (8th ed. 2013).
43. For example, several law enforcement agencies in southern Illinois use the storage
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invest a substantial amount of human and financial capital in systems
that were developed largely to satisfy the authentication requirement.44
Police departments have spent millions of dollars modernizing their
property and evidence systems,45 and they advertise their efforts as a
way of demonstrating their commitment to professional law enforce-
ment.46 Many agencies, from massive agencies like the New York
Police Department47 and the Los Angeles Police Department48 to the
much smaller University of Arizona Police Department,49 include a
description of their property and evidence storage and tracking function
on their websites. More formally, the Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies, an independent accrediting body, includes
“Property and Evidence Control” as a component of its review of police
facilities at the Gallatin County Sheriff’s Office. Unfortunately, this allowed then-sheriff
Raymond R. Martin to purloin the narcotics stored there to supply his own drug distribution ring.
United States v. Martin, 692 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2012); Jim Suhr, Appeals Court Upholds
Raymond Martin’s Life Term, DAILY REG. (Feb. 10, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://www.dailyregister.
com/article/20140210/NEWS/140219857.
44. Most impounded property is evidence that will be used in criminal cases. See Property
Clerk Division, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/property_clerk/property_
clerk.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (stating that about two-thirds of all impounded property is
evidence in criminal cases); Evidence Property Room, COLUM. POLICE DEP’T, http://
www.columbiapd.net/evidence.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (stating that “the majority of
property managed by the Property unit is evidence required for criminal cases”). But I would be
remiss if I did not mention additional justifications for a comprehensive property storage and
tracking system. For non-evidentiary property—including lost-and-found property that is to be
returned to the owner, items that will be auctioned off, or contraband that will be destroyed
because no owner could be identified or it is no longer needed for a criminal case—maintaining a
chain of custody allows an agency to both deter and detect employee misconduct. Further, quite
apart from the authentication requirement in criminal cases, a well-run system for tracking seized
property can prevent embarrassing mistakes like misplacing or inadvertently destroying particular
pieces of evidence. See 21 Years After Wrongful Conviction—and After 12 Years Fighting for
Access to Evidence—DNA Proves Alan Newton’s Innocence, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 6, 2006),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/21_Years_After_Wrongful_Conviction__And_After_
12_Years_Fighting_for_Access_to_Evidence__DNA_Proves_Alan_Newtons_Innocence.php.; see
also Elizabeth A. Bawden, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow—Three Common Mistakes Courts Make
When Police Lose or Destroy Evidence with Apparent Exculpatory Value, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
335, 336 (2000).
45. John Marzulli & Allison Gendar, Despite Budget Crunch, Cops Hope for $25M for
Evidence Tracking Program, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2008, 11:25 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/crime/budget-crunch-cops-hope-25m-evidence-tracking-program-article-1.2865
53.
46. See, e.g., Sheldon Gardner, Beach Police Getting New Evidence Room, ST. AUGUSTINE
RECORDER (Dec. 28, 2013, 1:08 AM), http://staugustine.com/news/local-news/2013-12-27/beach-
police-getting-new-evidence-room.
47. Property Clerk Division, supra note 44.
48. Property Division, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/
content_basic_view/6414 (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
49. Property and Evidence, U. ARIZ. POLICE DEP’T, http://uapd.arizona.edu/divisions/
operations-support/property-evidence (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
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agencies.50 On an individual level, the International Association for
Property and Evidence serves as a membership association for sworn
and civilian law enforcement personnel “directly assigned to the prop-
erty/evidence function.”51
Through the adoption of the authentication requirement, the judi-
ciary has affected how law enforcement agencies design their facilities,
train their officers, and display their professionalism.
C. Forensic Evidence and Crime Laboratories
Much has been written about the “CSI Effect”: how popular
media’s portrayals of the forensic sciences changes public perceptions
about criminal investigations and how those changing perceptions affect
the criminal justice system.52 In academic and popular media, the term
“CSI Effect” has evolved to mean at least three different things. In its
most common usage, the phrase refers to the effect on jurors of having
been exposed to fictional dramas that focus on solving crimes entirely or
primarily through forensic evidence.53 The accompanying thesis is that
television shows, movies, and books will change (and have changed)
jurors’ perceptions about the type of evidence that a prosecutor can
introduce in any given case, which leads jurors to expect prosecutors to
carry their burden in real-life cases by introducing forensic evidence that
carries the imprimatur of scientific rigor. Jurors, so the thesis goes, will
be less likely to convict in the absence of such evidence.54 Further, they
may be willing to accept forensic evidence at face value, putting their
50. CALEA Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/
content/standards-titles (last visited Oct. 29, 2014); see also Joseph T. Latta & William P. Kiley,
Property and Evidence Control—The Hidden (and Ticking) Time Bomb, CALEA (June 2007),
http://www.calea.org/calea-update-magazine/issue-94/property-and-evidence-control-hidden-and-
ticking-time-bomb.
51. IAPE Membership Requirements, INT’L ASS’N FOR PROP. & EVIDENCE, http://
www.iape.org/memRequire.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
52. See DENNIS J. STEVENS, MEDIA AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE CSI EFFECT (2011); Simon
A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis
in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009); N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The
CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real
Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS 357, 357 (2007); Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg
Barak, A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the
‘CSI Effect’ Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 334–36 (2006); The “CSI Effect,”
ECONOMIST, APR. 22, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15949089/print.
53. CHRISTOPHER J. FERGUSON, ADOLESCENTS, CRIME, AND THE MEDIA 69–78 (2013)
(analyzing the various phenomena of the “influence of science-driven law-enforcement shows,”
commonly dubbed the CSI effect, on career choices, juror expectations in criminal cases, and the
increased sophistication of new criminals who learned “countermeasures to investigative
techniques” by watching science-driven crime dramas).
54. Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1056–63 (2006); Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect:
Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70 (2006).
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faith in the fingerprint analysis or DNA evidence that they have seen
used in popular media. If true, this version of the CSI Effect has impor-
tant ramifications for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.55 The
second meaning of the CSI Effect, which is most relevant to colleges
and universities around the country, refers to the potential increase in the
number of students who, having been exposed to fictional accounts of
forensics, become interested in careers in forensics or law enforce-
ment.56 The law enforcement community is more likely to use the phrase
“CSI Effect” in a third way, to describe a distinctly different phenome-
non: the potential for fictional portrayals of forensic crime solving to
educate criminals about ways to preclude or frustrate actual investiga-
tions.57 These standard usages tend to be used by insiders (scholars,
judges, university administrators, prosecutors, and police) to describe
the effects on outsiders (jurors, students, and criminal offenders), but
that tendency may mask the impact that the CSI Effect has had on the
criminal justice system itself.
There are a host of controversies and complications with forensic
evidence. The validity of the conclusions reached by various forensic
disciplines have been called into question.58 The organization of crime
laboratories as part of a police agency, which remains the dominant
model for administering a crime lab, may result in conflicts of interest
when employees self-identify as law enforcement agents rather than as
independent and impartial analysts.59 And there is always the possibility
that analysts will fabricate the results of analysis, either because they are
attempting to cut away at a backlog of cases or because they are seeking
to advance what they view as a law enforcement interest.60 Regardless
55. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Should Judges Worry About the “CSI Effect”?, 47
CT. REV. J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 20, 24 (2011); Katie L. Dysart, Managing the CSI Effect in Jurors,
A.B.A. TRIAL EVIDENCE (May 28, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/
trialevidence/articles/winterspring2012-0512-csi-effect-jurors.html.
56. FERGUSON, supra note 53, at 70–72.
57. Id. at 76–78; Julian Borger, Hit TV Crime Show Helps Criminals Cover Their Tracks,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/feb/08/usnews.broadcasting.
58. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG (2011) [hereinafter CONVICTING THE INNOCENT]; DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED
EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 24–37 (2012) (describing the fallibility of
some typical forensic analysis including fingerprint analysis, ballistics, and forensic dentistry);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD, 184–89 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12589&
page=142; Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
59. SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS: CURBING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES (forthcoming Carolina Academic Press 2014);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 184.
60. Late last year, the now-infamous chemist Annie Dookhan, who worked in a state-run
laboratory in Massachusetts, pleaded guilty to falsifying results of drug analysis, potentially
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of its many pitfalls, however, forensic evidence is both broadly admissi-
ble61 and popularly accessible.
As the public became more aware of and keenly interested in foren-
sic science, police departments have begun to trumpet their commitment
to scientific evidence-gathering and analysis.62 It is a rare day when
some police department or another does not issue a press release touting
the successful use of forensics as a crime solving technique63 or
stressing their commitment to using technology to investigate future
crimes64 or cold cases.65 And while the definition of the word “science”
in the context of forensics is foreign to professionals within the scientific
community,66 both public opinion and judicial rulings have prompted
law enforcement agencies to invest heavily in the trappings of scientific
legitimacy.
In 2002, the first year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics has
data, there were 351 publicly-funded crime laboratories nationwide, and
their collective operating budgets totaled more than $750 million.67 That
year, the laboratories were asked to handle 2.7 million new requests for
analysis.68 By 2009, the number of laboratories had grown to more than
400 and their combined operating budgets had more than doubled to a
total of over $1.6 billion.69 The increase was necessary to accommodate
the 4.1 million requests for analysis they faced that year,70 and law
enforcement agencies continue to push for more. Many state and
affecting tens of thousands of criminal cases. The laboratory, like many others, was operating with
a substantial backlog. Eugenie Samuel Reich, Boston Scandal Exposes Backlog, 409 NATURE 153
(2012), available at http://www.nature.com/news/boston-scandal-exposes-backlog-1.1156.
61. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (1998).
62. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 2.
63. See, e.g., Greg Gross, Police: DNA Links 2005 Burglary to Maryland Man, YORK
DISPATCH.COM (July 8, 2014, 6:32 PM), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/news/ci_26110197/police-
dna-links-2005-burglary-maryland-man; David Gurliacci, Report: Police Say DNA Results Helped
Nab Robber of Vernon Bank, VERNON PATCH (July 8, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://vernon.patch.com/
groups/police-and-fire/p/report-police-say-dna-results-helped-nab-robber-of-vernon-bank.
64. Andrea Sinclair, New Statewide DNA Lab Helps Colorado Springs Police Focus on
Property Crimes, GAZETTE (June 23, 2014, 7:40 AM), http://gazette.com/new-statewide-dna-lab-
helps-colorado-springs-police-focus-on-property-crimes/article/1521876.
65. See, e.g., Chris Raia, Police Find DNA Possibly Connected to Unsolved Murder, WPRI
EYEWITNESS NEWS (July 9, 2014, 5:31 AM), http://wpri.com/2014/07/09/police-find-dna-
possibly-connected-to-unsolved-murder/.
66. See HARRIS, supra note 58, at 20–24; TERRENCE F. KIELY, FORENSIC EVIDENCE: SCIENCE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1–2 (2d ed. 2006).
67. JOSEPH L. PETERSON & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2002, at 1 (2005).
68. Id.
69. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED
FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2009, at 1, 10 (2012).
70. Id.
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regional crime labs have become so backlogged with requests for analy-
sis that they now only accept requests relating to violent felonies. Police
agencies have responded by lobbying for new publicly-funded crime
laboratory facilities71 or by contracting with private labs to perform
analysis for non-violent crimes.72 Further, individual agencies continue
to call for the addition of laboratory capabilities. Some departments have
invested in forensics by continually expanding the range of services that
their in-house laboratory can provide.73 Others have changed the way
that they talk about evidence collection and analysis. On more than a
few occasions, the then-chief of the municipal police department where I
served as an officer referred to our crime scene technicians—hired to
photograph and collect evidence at high-stakes crime scenes—as “foren-
sic scientists,” leading several of them to jokingly wonder what had hap-
pened to the additional pay and education that the more prestigious title
implied.
The enthusiasm to produce useful and admissible, not to mention
popular, evidence is nothing new. According to the National Law
Enforcement Museum, the anthropometric method of identifying
criminals by measuring different parts of their bodies, developed by
Paris police officer Alphonse Bertillion in the 1870s, was quickly
adopted by police departments around the world and remained in use
until it was supplanted by fingerprint identification—also championed
by Bertillion—in the early 1900s.74 Today, almost 150 years later, we
see police departments continuing to take evidentiary considerations into
71. Sinclair, supra note 64.
72. Joe Gamm, LabCorp to Process Greensboro Police DNA Requests, NEWS & RECORD
(June 23, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.news-record.com/news/article_844f5dd2-fa71-11e3-8012-
0017a43b2370.html.
73. See, e.g., Crime Lab, RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://www.rcsd.net/inv/
crimelab.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (describing the 2002 addition of a drug analysis unit and
a fire debris analysis unit, the 2003 addition of a firearms/tool marks unit, and the 2004 addition of
a DNA unit). In addition to what one might consider the “standard tools” of forensic analysis—
DNA, fingerprints, ballistics, bite-mark identification, tool mark identification, and blood spatter
analysis, to name a few—other scientific fields have been plumbed for potentially useful
contributions, including forensic agronomy (the analysis of plants and seeds) and forensic
entomology (the analysis of insects). See also M. LEE GOFF, A FLY FOR THE PROSECUTION: HOW
INSECT EVIDENCE HELPS SOLVE CRIMES (2000); Emily Fredrix, Forensic Agronomy Merges Two
Worlds, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Sept. 7, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/
forensic-agronomy-merges-two-worlds/article_68dcbe36-1089-5a26-b228-7ab000991a22.html.
74. Bertillon System of Criminal Identification, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT MUSEUM, http://
www.nleomf.org/museum/news/newsletters/online-insider/november-2011/bertillon-system-
criminal-identification.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2014). Ironically, the fingerprints originally
published by Bertillon as examples of his 16-point identification system were later revealed to be
forgeries. Clifford G. Miller, Pointing the Finger, L. SOC’Y, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/
communities/advocacy/articles/pointing-the-finger/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (quoting R. v.
Buckley, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1191 (Eng.)).
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account as they adapt their policies and procedures to capitalize on judi-
cial rulings and public perception.
III. EXPERIENCE, EXPERTISE, AND ERROR
In this Part, I use the rules surrounding lay and expert opinion testi-
mony to explore the continued potential of evidentiary rulings to change
police training in a way that could lead to meaningful reforms of police
culture. The use of witnesses with specialized knowledge to assist the
court is an ancient practice, going back at least as far as the Roman
courts, where a judge could summon an artis periti (skilled expert) to
provide information about scientific phenomena or the details of various
trades and professions.75 As the inquisitorial system, which preferred
jurors with personal knowledge of the matters under dispute, shifted to
the more familiar adversarial model, “the testimony of witnesses and
real evidence [rather than personal knowledge] became the sole source
of factual data upon which a verdict could be rendered.”76 The role of
witnesses evolved as courts developed the opinion rule, which barred
witnesses from offering information about which they lacked first-hand
knowledge.77 Inevitably, courts soon developed exceptions to the opin-
ion rule, including the admissibility of expert opinions.78 There is no
clear record of the first dispute over an expert’s qualifications or conclu-
sions, but a cynic might estimate that it occurred contemporaneously or
even a few seconds before the first expert was allowed to offer testi-
mony. It is no exaggeration to say that the questions that surround expert
testimony have been a constant source of frustration for judges and
scholars alike.79
In modern times, the Supreme Court has largely left it to trial court
judges to resolve tough questions, establishing them as evidentiary gate-
keepers responsible for separating the wheat from the chaff. To fulfill
that gatekeeping role in the context of opinion testimony, judges base
their admissibility rulings on the answers to two questions: First, will the
75. Percy Edwards, Chemical Experts—A Trio of Important Factors in the Detection of
Crime, 42 CENT. L.J. 323, 323 (1896); Malcolm E. Lafargue, The Value of Expert Testimony, 12
LOY. L.J. 31, 31 (1931).
76. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 416–17.
79. See, e.g., J. SNOWDEN BELL, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 6–7 (1879);
Ladd, supra note 76; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39
VAND. L. REV. 577, 581–84 (1986); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901–1902); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving
Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986); Gordon Courtenay Hamilton, Expert
Testimony (1895) (unpublished thesis, Cornell Law School), available at http://scholarship.
law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=historical_theses.
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witness be offering lay or expert testimony? Second, if the witness is
providing expert testimony, is it relevant and sufficiently reliable to
admit? Both questions have been at the heart of any number of spirited
debates between courts and scholars, and for good reason: there is a
substantial amount of uncertainty for judges to muddle through before
answering either question.80 In this section, I discuss each of those two
questions as they relate to police testimony, identifying areas of concern
and the potential for evidentiary rulings to improve police practices.
A. The Lay/Expert Testimony Distinction
To distinguish between lay and expert opinion testimony, judges
first look to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Prior to the 2000 amend-
ments, Rule 701, which governs lay opinions, permitted some overlap
between lay opinion and expert opinion testimony. According to the
Advisory Committee Notes, the amendments to Rule 701 were intended
“to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements [that govern expert
testimony] will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an
expert in lay witness clothing.”81 Such an evasion would avoid the
expert witness disclosure requirements found in both the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,82 as
well as a measured determination that the proffered expert testimony is
sufficiently reliable. Today, a lay witness may provide an opinion that is
“rationally based” on his own perceptions when that opinion is “helpful”
to clarify the witness’ testimony or to resolve a factual question.83 For
example, a bouncer at a nightclub who described a patron’s clenched
fists and narrowed eyes would be permitted to offer his lay opinion that
the patron was angry. Knowledgeable lay witnesses are also allowed to
offer their opinions about “an endless number of items that cannot be
described factually in words apart from inferences.”84 As the Advisory
Committee Notes contemplate, a business owner could testify about the
projected profits of his enterprise without being qualified as an expert
because of his “particularized”—note, not “specialized”—knowledge.85
However, a lay witness is not permitted to offer any opinions that are
based in “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” which
80. See United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he
line between expert testimony . . . and lay opinion testimony . . . is not easy to draw”). See also 1
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 59 (6th ed. 2006).
81. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments.
82. Id.
83. FED. R. EVID. 701(a)–(b).
84. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments.
85. Id.
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are subject to Rule 702.86
Rule 702, in turn, permits “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer testi-
mony, including opinion testimony, if the expert’s specialized knowl-
edge will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.”87 To be admissible, such testimony must be
based on “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods”
that are “reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case.”88 Unlike lay opin-
ions, which “‘result[ ] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday
life,’” expert testimony “‘results from a process of reasoning which can
be mastered only by specialists in the field.’”89 In extreme cases, includ-
ing many that involve scientific expertise, the difference between “rea-
soning familiar in everyday life” and “reasoning which can be mastered
only by specialists” is fairly stark. In the example of the nightclub
bouncer, the witness relied on familiar, everyday reasoning to deduce
that a patron was angry by looking at the expression on his face and his
clenched fists. An astrophysicist, in contrast, uses the latter type of rea-
soning to deduce the chemical composition of an alien planet’s environ-
ment by measuring the way light behaves as it moves through that
planet’s atmosphere.90
Not all examples are so clear, however, and the grey area between
the bouncer and the astrophysicist includes a great deal of police testi-
mony. Courts have often struggled to draw definitive lines between lay
and expert police opinion testimony. In part, this is because, perhaps
more than any other single witness, individual police officers often pro-
vide both lay and opinion testimony.91 This struggle, however, is also a
result of the nature of police testimony itself. In addition to testifying as
a fact witness providing information based on their own perceptions,
officers commonly offer a wide range of professional opinions: why a
particular action, such as the well-known “furtive movement” that so
often defies exact description, was suspicious or threatening;92 the tools
86. FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
87. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
88. FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(d).
89. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments (quoting and
adopting the reasoning of State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn. 1992)).
90. Josh Chamot, Nat’l Sci. Found., Exploring the Makeup of Extrasolar Planets, LIVE SCI.
(Mar. 27, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.livescience.com/28218-planet-exploration-studying-
chemicals-light-nsf-ria.html.
91. The Advisory Committee Notes specifically contemplate that possibility, using the
example of officers who could offer a lay opinion that a suspect was acting suspiciously but who
would have had to be experts to testify about code words relating to the narcotics trade. FED. R.
EVID. 701 advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments (discussing United States v.
Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997)).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 13 (3d Cir. 1997) (allowing officer
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and modus operandi of narcotics trafficking, murder,93 child molesta-
tion,94 and various other criminal endeavors; the position held by any
given individual in a criminal enterprise;95 the quantity of drugs consis-
tent with personal use as opposed to narcotics trafficking;96 the indica-
tors that someone is engaged in counter-surveillance;97 whether
someone is under the influence of alcohol or narcotics;98 the translation
of “street jargon” and code words;99 the relative speeds and positions of
vehicles leading up to a crash as well as the causes of a car crash;100
whether they or other officers used a reasonable amount of force in a
particular situation;101 the relative safety of different police weapons;102
the distance at which one vehicle can safely follow another;103 whether a
firearm moved through interstate commerce;104 and so on. And courts
testimony that based on the officer’s experience as well as his observations of the suspect’s
behavior, he believed the suspect was attempting to conceal something).
93. United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 230 (1st Cir. 2011) (admitting an FBI agent’s
testimony that a bag with a knife, gloves, and duct tape was a “murder kit”).
94. United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D. Me. 2010) (considering the
proposed testimony of a 30-year FBI veteran as to the behavior patterns and characteristics of
child molestors, which would be based primarily on his experiences in previous cases).
95. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing a scenario in
which an officer’s testimony about the roles individual participants played in a criminal
transaction might be admissible).
96. United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232–33 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e have
repeatedly upheld the use of expert testimony by government agents to describe the characteristics
and operating methods of narcotics dealers.”).
97. United States v. Garza-Hernandez, 623 F.2d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that DEA
officers’ observations of a suspect’s behavior, including suspect’s driving in a “circuitous
manner,” was sufficient to establish probable cause when, “[f]rom their training and expertise, the
agents knew that this type of driving was intended to reveal whether [suspect] was being followed
[because] the agents had often observed this type of driving by those engaged in illegal drug
trade”).
98. Hall v. Cnty. of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (D. Ne. 2007) (“[I]t was [the
officer’s] belief, based on his training and experience, that Hall’s wide eyes, fidgety hand
movements, nervous foot tapping, and sweating all indicated that he was under the influence of a
narcotic.”).
99. United States v. Santiago, 560 F.3d 62, 66–67 (1st Cir. 2009) (admitting the “code word
interpretations” of an officer who had “heard and used the coded language in his undercover drug
buys relating to the investigation”).
100. Swink v. Colcord, 239 F.2d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1956) (allowing highway patrolman
testimony regarding the point of impact and relative speeds of two vehicles involved in a
collision).
101. Smith v. McGee, No. 2:06-cv-00181, 2007 WL 4191725, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 21,
2007) (concluding that officer actions “were reasonable under the circumstances” given officer
testimony that “‘based on [their] training and experience only necessary force was used to subdue
the inmates who were both combative and refused to respond to [their] request to stop fighting’”).
102. Pierre v. Gruler, No. 3:06-cv-00045, 2009 WL 383352, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2009)
(allowing officer testimony that “based on [his] training and experience, the taser is a safe
alternative to going ‘hands on’ or using a weapon that can cause substantially more damage”).
103. United States v. Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) (admitting officer
testimony that “a safe following distance, in his training and experience, was two seconds”).
104. United States v. Robinson, 205 F. App’x 415, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2006) (using a special
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have come to different conclusions about how to categorize police opin-
ion testimony. In the First Circuit, for example, a police officer may
offer lay testimony about whether a particular quantity of narcotics is
consistent with trafficking as opposed to personal use and about the
tools and methods of drug traffickers, although such testimony is often
(but not always) considered expert testimony in other circuits.105
Confusion about whether an officer’s opinion is lay testimony or
expert testimony is problematic for at least two reasons. First, an officer
may offer a lay opinion that is dressed in the language of expertise,
artificially inflating the gravitas of his own testimony by grounding his
opinion in his “training and experience,” a phrase that has become
almost comically common not just in criminal trials, but also in police
training materials themselves.106 For example, officers have referred to
their training and experience when testifying that a “‘long-necked, glass
bottle’” is consistent with a container used to hold alcohol;107 that
droopy, red eyes are a “common sign of alcohol or drug impairment”;108
that gunfire at 1:00 A.M. is often “associated with criminal activity”;109
that having a suspect kneel rather than stand “takes away most of their
mobility”;110 and so on. These are silly examples, and intentionally so—
the point is that, with the addition of a simple, formulaic phrase, com-
pletely mundane observations are draped in the robes of specialized
knowledge and trained reasoning.
For officers, there are both instrumental and cultural reasons to
ground their testimony, particularly opinion testimony, in their training
and experience. Officers are aware, of course, of the ultimate conse-
quences of the proceeding in which they testify. It would be laughable to
suggest that they were entirely blind to the conviction at stake in a crimi-
nal trial or the money damages at stake in constitutional torts cases. All
agent’s knowledge of a gun manufacturer’s current and previous locations to prove the origin of a
gun and thus the “interstate commerce nexus element of the charge”).
105. See United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2012).
106. See, e.g., STEVE ALBRECHT, TACTICAL PERFECTION FOR STREET COPS: SURVIVAL TACTICS
FOR FIELD CONTACTS, DANGEROUS CALLS, AND SPECIAL ARRESTS 73–74 (2009) (“The courts
have given law-enforcement officers the leeway to make stops based on their ability to assess the
person’s potential for criminal activity. You have a wide variety of reasons to make a stop,
including your training and experience, [sic] and your intimate knowledge of the crimes and
crooks in your work area and nearby communities.”).
107. United States v. Ewing, No. 13-40005-JAR, 2013 WL 4082717, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 13,
2013).
108. United States v. Boyd, No. 5:09-cr-06008, 2010 WL 3842015, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 27,
2010).
109. United States v. Stokes, No. 02-40116-01-SAC, 2002 WL 31928488, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec.
30, 2002).
110. Chatman v. Buller, No. 6:12-cv-00182, 2013 WL 632355, at *5 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 20,
2013).
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other things being equal, officers prefer for arrestees to go to jail111 and
to avoid civil liability both for themselves and for other officers. Testify-
ing based on their training and experience advances those goals. Judges,
after all, are “generally obliged to accord deference and even great
respect to an officer’s training and experience.”112 For example, courts
have, “with a regularity bordering on the echolalic, endorsed the concept
that a law enforcement officer’s training and experience may yield
insights that support a probable cause determination.”113 Similarly,
courts make reasonable suspicion determinations by filtering the facts
“through the lens of the [officer’s] training and experience.”114 And for
juries, such phrasing adds an element of believability to the testimony.
This may be particularly true if jurors perceive that police officers,
unlike many other expert witnesses, are not “hired guns,” and so their
testimony may be viewed as more credible than that of a paid, profes-
sional witness.115
But more powerful than the instrumental reasons are the cultural
reasons that officers use such phrasing. Officers may not know very
much about the nuances of evidence law, but they receive formal train-
ing in how to testify.116 That training typically emphasizes being an
effective, professional witness.117 By grounding opinions in training and
experience, officers bolster that image. Beyond formal training, individ-
uals who work in policing adopt the idiosyncratic language of law
enforcement. An officer does not testify that he sees a cream-colored
111. This is not to suggest that officers are deeply vested, personally or professionally, in
convicting defendants; they are not. I explicate this point more fully in Stoughton, supra note 2, at
877–82.
112. United States v. Martin, 679 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (W.D. La. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
113. United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 2014).
114. United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013).
115. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1125–30 (1997).
116. Police training begins in the police academy, where providing testimony is a common
component of the curriculum. See, e.g., Police Academy Curriculum, JOHNSON COUNTY
COMMUNITY C., http://www.jccc.edu/police-academy/police-academy-curriculum.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2014) (including in the Kansas police academy curriculum ten hours of
instruction on “Courtroom Testimony” out of a total 639 hours of instruction). Most law
enforcement agencies that do not have their own police academies also require a certain amount of
additional in-house training that is specific to that department, which may include further training
on testifying. Additional training in testifying is also available to officers from a variety of private
vendors in the form of in-person seminars and books. See, e.g., DON LEWIS, THE POLICE OFFICER
IN THE COURTROOM (2001); Courtroom Testimony Seminar, OAKLAND POLICE ACAD., https://
www.oaklandcc.edu/CREST/pdf%20training%20flyers/2015-03-27%20-%20Courtroom%20
Testimony.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
117. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T. LAW ENFORCEMENT, 1 FLORIDA BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING
PROGRAM: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY 383–90 (2014), available at https://www.fdle.
state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/b36cf30a-ebea-42dd-becb-152301d06da5/2014-07_LE_Text.aspx.
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vehicle, for example; instead, he sees a vehicle, “cream in color.”118 The
constant “training and experience” refrain may be another linguistic
peculiarity, but it is one that contributes to the insularity of police cul-
ture. As a great many authors have remarked, the policing environment
and culture inculcate an “us versus them” mentality that separates
officers from non-officers,119 creating a norm that limits sharing infor-
mation about police practices outside of police circles.120 The phrase
“training and experience” serves to demarcate the line between officer
and civilian, expressing explicitly that an officer’s conclusions are
grounded in information available to them by virtue of their status.
Despite the manifold justifications for officers to ground their testi-
mony in their “training and experience,” dressing lay opinions up in
expert language cuts against the very reason that evidence law distin-
guishes the two. When a witness offers a lay opinion, the jury is
expected to test that opinion against their own familiar, everyday reason-
ing. Providing a lay opinion using expert phrasing risks artificially alter-
ing the fact-finder’s credibility determination, presenting an officer as
more knowledgeable, and thus more credible, than the rules of evidence
contemplate. It may also have something of the same effect on officers
themselves, advancing the mystique of law enforcement by encouraging
officers to think that all of their conclusions are formed not by common
reasoning, but by virtue of their special skill sets. Such a mindset can
only reinforce the “us versus them” mentality that has been commented
on so often.121
A second problem is the possibility that a prosecutor may solicit,
and an officer provide, expert testimony in the guise of a lay opinion.
These slips may be intentional—a dodge around both the requirement to
disclose expert witnesses in advance of trial122 and the burden of quali-
fying the officer as an expert at trial,123 but it is also possible that they
are inadvertent. Given the inconsistency among courts, it would not be a
surprise that some number of prosecutors would have a good-faith, if
118. See United States v. Clarkson, 551 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
119. See, e.g., HARRY W. MORE & LARRY S. MILLER, EFFECTIVE POLICE SUPERVISION 179 (7th
ed. 2015) (“Insularity erects protective barriers between the police and the public and creates an
‘us versus them’ mentality.”). This aspect of police culture is both significant and consistent. See
MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR
SUCCESS 60 (1994).
120. JOHN HAGEDORN ET AL., U. ILL. CHI. DEP’T POL. SCI., CRIME, CORRUPTION AND COVER-
UPS IN THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–10 (2013), available at http://pols.uic.edu/docs/
default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/policecorruption.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2).
123. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
452 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:429
mistaken, belief than an officer will be offering lay testimony. And
officers, who can be surprisingly legally sophisticated in some ways, are
unlikely to have any training or a great deal of information about the
rules governing expert testimony. Regardless of the reasoning, when an
expert opinion is provided as lay testimony, it avoids the reliability
screening that the Rules of Evidence require. Although precise data are
elusive, it takes no great imagination to conclude that expert testimony
that has not been subject to such screening may be less reliable than
expert testimony that has been screened by opposing counsel and a
judge.
To resolve both problems—lay testimony being dressed up in the
language of expertise and expert opinions being introduced as lay testi-
mony—judges must carefully delineate between officers’ lay and expert
testimony, but in different ways. The first resolution is the simplest;
officers should be counseled to avoid volunteering their training and
experience as the basis of an opinion unless asked, and prosecutors—
who may be fairly expected to have a better education about the nuances
of evidence law—should structure their examination to avoid accepting
the bare assertion of “training and experience” as grounds for an
officer’s opinion. Judges should also caution jurors that they are to test
lay testimony against their own perceptions, keeping in mind the context
of the officer’s testimony and additional evidence present in the case. In
many jurisdictions, this would be a departure from current practice;
model jury instructions can include a pattern instruction for expert wit-
nesses, but “an instruction on ‘lay’ opinion generally is not needed” and
is typically reserved for special circumstances.124 Other jurisdictions
include instructions on lay opinion testimony as a matter of course; this
should be the rule rather than the exception. The instruction used in Cal-
ifornia offers an excellent template:
(A witness/Witnesses)[, who (was/were) not testifying as [an]
expert[s],] gave (his/her/their) opinion[s] during the trial. You may
but are not required to accept (that/those) opinion[s] as true or cor-
rect. You may give the opinion[s] whatever weight you think appro-
priate. Consider the extent of the witness’s opportunity to perceive
the matters on which his or her opinion is based, the reasons the wit-
ness gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the
witness relied in forming that opinion. You must decide whether
information on which the witness relied was true and accurate. You
may disregard all or any part of an opinion that you find unbeliev-
able, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.125
124. See PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.07
(1998), available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/pjury.pdf.
125. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 333 (2014), available
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The resolution to the second problem is more complex; judges must
identify whether a particular statement constitutes expert testimony or
lay testimony. To qualify as an expert, remember, a witness must have
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and, for their
opinion to be admissible, their “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [must] help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.”126 This problem, of course, is certainly not
unique to the law enforcement context, and so much has been written on
distinguishing between lay and expert testimony that it is impossible to
provide either a full list of authorities or a concise description of all of
the issues and possible solutions that evidence scholars have raised.127
For policing, the best solution may be to acknowledge that a great deal
of opinion testimony by police officers is likely beyond the permissible
scope of lay testimony because it is based on specialized knowledge: the
officer’s training and experience.128
Consider two contrasting examples. A police officer who had previ-
ously been exposed to the smell of marijuana could offer a lay opinion
that the odor he smelled emanating from a vehicle was that of marijuana,
under the simple reasoning that someone who has been exposed to an
odor previously is capable of identifying it when he smells it again. Now
perhaps it had been several years since the officer had last smelled mari-
juana and perhaps he had mistakenly identified other smells as mari-
juana in the past, but those are arguments that go to weight rather than
admissibility. However, a police officer who had previously learned
about the organization of a criminal operation could not offer a lay opin-
ion that a group of people he had investigated were involved in a crimi-
nal enterprise (or, to use what would likely be more accurate phrasing,
that the people were organized in a manner consistent with involvement
in a criminal enterprise). While both officers are making a comparison
of one thing (a smell or an organization) to another, determining the
relevant points of similarity and dissimilarity between different organi-
zations—both legitimate and criminal—to arrive at an opinion about the
at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim_juryins.pdf. The bench instructions
inform judges that the bracketed clause “who (was/were) not testifying as [an] expert(s)” is to be
read “if an expert witness also testified in the case.” Id. Such a clarifying instruction should also
be added when lay witnesses use language that suggests that their opinion rests on specialized
knowledge, training, or experience.
126. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
127. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 79, at 478–79.
128. Some courts, but not all, have generally taken this approach. See United States v.
Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 56–57 n.16 (1st Cir. 2012) (Lipez, J., concurring) (collecting cases from
other circuits holding that officers may testify as experts about narcotics operations and coded
language).
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type of enterprise that a particular group of people are engaged in is not
an exercise in “familiar, everyday” reasoning.
When an officer’s testimony relies, implicitly or explicitly, on
knowledge beyond the ken of the average juror, the judge should turn to
the second half of the gatekeeping function: assessing the reliability of
the foundation for the officer’s opinion.
B. Assessing the Reliability of Expert Testimony
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals129 and Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael,130 the Supreme Court assigned trial court judges as
gatekeepers, responsible for excluding unreliable expert testimony.
Daubert provided some guidance for judges, offering five factors that,
while neither necessary nor sufficient, could be used to assess the reli-
ability of scientific testimony: whether the expert’s theory or technique
can be (and has been) assessed for reliability, whether it has been subject
to peer review and publication, whether it has been “generally accepted”
among the relevant community, whether there is a known or potential
error rate, and whether there are established standards and controls.131
The Kumho Tire Court held that trial court judges must satisfy their
gatekeeping function for both scientific and non-scientific expert testi-
mony, although it acknowledged that the relevance of the factors men-
tioned in Daubert would depend on “the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue.”132 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702
suggest a series of additional factors that can assist a judge in determin-
ing whether proffered expert testimony is reliable: whether the expert
witness has developed his opinion independent of or specifically for the
purpose of testifying in the underlying litigation; whether the expert was
as careful in developing his opinion for litigation as he would be in his
regular professional work; whether the expert has made an unfounded
jump from premise to conclusion; whether the expert has accounted for
obvious alternative explanations; and whether the expert’s field of
expertise is known to reach reliable results in the specific context of the
proffered opinion.133
In the context of policing, some law enforcement witnesses cer-
tainly testify on the basis of “scientific” or “technical” knowledge—
officers who testify about forensic analysis, accident reconstruction, or
the production of methamphetamine, for example. For these officers,
129. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
130. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
131. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
132. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149–52.
133. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments.
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like other scientific experts, the Daubert factors and additional factors
provide meaningful guidance. That is not the case for the majority of
police expert testimony, however, which falls under the general catch-all
of “other specialized knowledge.” In most cases, the courts eschew the
factors discussed above and instead recite the number of years of experi-
ence a police officer has, his current and prior job duties and assign-
ments, and any special training that the officer has received.134 This
opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
is typical:
Prior to his employment with the [Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (“DEA”)] in 1988, [the testifying officer] had been a member
of the Hartford Police Department for approximately seventeen years.
His training and experience in narcotics investigations included six
months at the Hartford Police Academy and several specialized
courses in drug enforcement and investigating techniques. [He] had
posed as an undercover officer for the Hartford Police Department, as
both a buyer and seller of drugs, well over 600 times.135
Having recited the testifying officer’s pertinent specialized training
and professional experience, the court then typically accepts the officer
as an expert, assured that the officer’s background provides a solid foun-
dation for opinion testimony. Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 703
allows experts to base their opinion on information that is reasonably
relied upon by experts in that field, even if that information is inadmissi-
ble in the given case.136 In the policing context, courts have credited
“general training and experience, [and] discussions with other law
enforcement officers” as information “reasonably relied upon by experts
in the law enforcement field.”137 The underlying assumption is explicit:
it is reasonable to rely on the information generated by general training
and experience and discussions with other officers.
For many of the most common types of officer testimony, however,
this approach is problematic; police training cannot, in a great many
cases, support the inference of reliability that expert qualification
demands. Much of police training comes in the form of verbal instruc-
tion, a series of anecdotes passed along by more senior officers. Some
are first-hand accounts, some are second-hand, and some have passed
through so many hands that it is appropriate to refer to them not as an
134. United States v. Flores-De-Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v.
Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 186–99 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gwynn, 82 F. App’x 787, 788 (4th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Velasquez, 271 F.3d 364, 366–69, 372–74 (2d Cir. 2001); Smith v.
United States, No. 1:09-cv-00533, 2012 WL 3929943, at *11 (D. Del. Sept. 7, 2012).
135. Velasquez, 271 F.3d at 367.
136. FED. R. EVID. 703.
137. United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir. 2008).
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account or even a series of accounts, but rather as part of an oral tradi-
tion within the law enforcement culture. This oral tradition serves multi-
ple purposes—it is, as one scholar has observed, “a sanity-preserver,
social glue, [and] a type of survival handbook”138—but the relevant
aspect for this article is the prominent role that storytelling plays in
police training. In this context, shared experiences and stories from more
senior officers take on a patina of veracity that becomes a mechanism of
carrying “cop knowledge” from the station house into the courtroom.
This is particularly acute given the heavy weight that the police
culture puts on learning from more experienced officers who have “been
there and seen it.” Learning from the stories and verbal guidance offered
by older peers is the primary method by which a new officer learns the
way things are done. The most popular police training books are widely
praised within law enforcement circles precisely because they use stories
and anecdotes from the street as support for various points.139 In the
world of police training, anecdotes rule. If it does not originate from the
lived experience of some officer somewhere, knowledge that has been
reduced to manuals and training guides is discounted. This is particu-
larly true with mandatory training materials such as those that a police
recruit or officer candidate receives at a police academy. A rookie police
officer hears variations on the phrase “forget everything you learned in
the academy” with astounding frequency, both when they are in the
academy itself140 and certainly once they have graduated from the acad-
138. Connie Fletcher, Listening to Narratives: The Dynamics of Capturing Police Experience,
13 INT’L J. LISTENING 46, 47 (1999).
139. For example, the first paragraph of the introduction to Remsberg’s The Tactical Edge:
Surviving High-Risk Patrol sets the stage for a discussion of the importance of officer survival
training with two graphic pictures, one of dead officers and one of a bloodstained patch of road
next to an empty police car, and the following text:
Back before officer survival got the attention it does today, four California Highway
Patrolmen were gunned down one night during a traffic stop involving two ex-
convicts with bank robbery on their minds. Later the offender who started the
shooting reflected on the first victim: “He got careless, so I wasted him.”
CHARLES REMSBERG, THE TACTICAL EDGE: SURVIVING HIGH-RISK PATROL 1 (1986) [hereinafter
THE TACTICAL EDGE]. Although not explicitly identified, the incident being described is known as
the Newhall massacre of April 1970. The book is replete with this and other stories and
references, but it fails to include any citation for this or any other event that it describes.
Remsberg’s later books follow the same convention. See CHARLES REMSBERG, BLOOD LESSONS:
WHAT COPS LEARN FROM LIFE-OR-DEATH ENCOUNTERS (2008); CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS
FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS, DRUG DISCOVERY & OFFICER SURVIVAL (1995);
CHARLES REMSBERG, STREET SURVIVAL: TACTICS FOR ARMED ENCOUNTERS (1980). Similarly, a
guide on “reality based training” makes a point of demonstrating the dangers of an improperly run
training program by providing a list of twelve anecdotes of training accidents, none of which have
accompanying citations. 1 KENNETH R. MURRAY, TRAINING AT THE SPEED OF LIFE 9–10 (2006).
140. A 2005 post on a forum for law enforcement officers is instructive. In it, the original
contributor, then in the police academy, notes that the academy instructors are telling the would-
be officers that they “have to do this by the book,” but that a field training officer will have them
2015] EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AS POLICE REFORM 457
emy and are in training at a specific police department.141 The phrase
and the concept behind it are not just empty words; in the wake of the
Rodney King beating, the Los Angeles Police Department was dismayed
by the “chasm between what recruits are taught at the Police Academy
about the proper use of force and what they learn[ed] from training
officers in the field.”142 Academy training, it seems, was viewed by field
training officers as too removed from the “real world” to be a good
model for new officers.
This emphasis on learning from real world experiences, as opposed
to formalized police training, is even more powerful in the context of
privileging knowledge that originated within the law enforcement com-
munity over information that originates outside of it. As David Harris
put it in the context of police skepticism of externally-imposed evidence
reforms, like sequential line-ups, “[P]olice believe that they have spe-
cial, experience-based and intuitive knowledge that those outside their
occupational circle neither share nor understand.”143 Laboratory experi-
ments are derided or dismissed, and the observations of psychologists
and other scholars who study police interactions and procedure are dis-
counted for being divorced from the experiential knowledge collected by
generations of police officers.144
This is not to suggest that “cop knowledge” always gets it wrong—
that certainly is not the case. A great deal of accurate factual knowledge
is developed from repeated observations. But the system of information
dissemination within the law enforcement community renders verifica-
tion difficult in many cases, opening the door to inaccuracy and unreli-
change the way they do things “once [they] are out of the academy.” The first respondent points
out that the “academy instructors are required to provide you information in a certain way to avoid
vicarious liability and failure to properly train litigation,” but he goes on to note that the academy
instructors “know damn well that you will be doing things different [sic] once you get out on the
street.” Cat_Doc, Comment to Academy vs. FTO Procedures, REAL POLICE (Sept. 2, 2005, 2:53
AM), http://www.realpolice.net/forums/ask-cop-112/39066-academy-vs-fto-procedures.html.
141. See, e.g., Mark Malmin, Changing Police Subculture, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr.
2012, at 14, available at http://leb.fbi.gov/2012/april/leb-april-2012 (“Sometimes, [field training
officers (“FTO”)] tell recruits that they should forget everything they learned in the academy
because their FTO will teach them about ‘real’ police work—including the subculture.”); Matthew
D. Bostrom, The Influence of Higher Education on Police Officer Work Habits, POLICE CHIEF
(Oct. 2005), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&
article_id=722&issue_id=102005 (“[W]hen officers enter the field training program, they are
often assigned to work with veteran officers who utter statements similar to ‘Forget about what
you learned in the academy, kid. Things are different in real life.’”).
142. Ted Rohrlich, LAPD Seeking to Improve Rookies’ Training?: Police: The Common
Advice from Field Officers to ‘Forget Everything You Learned at the Academy’ Is Subverting
Teaching on Restraint in the Use of Force, Administrators Say, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1991), http:/
/articles.latimes.com/1991-09-17/local/me-2874_1_field-training-officers.
143. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 67.
144. Id.
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ability. As a result, cop knowledge is often a confusing amalgam of
accurate and inaccurate information. For example, officers are trained to
look for threats in part by looking at a person’s hands.145 That makes
sense; the vast majority of weapons that an officer may encounter will
either be the hands themselves (curled into fists) or held in a hand. But
not all of the cop knowledge that an officer is imbued with is so straight-
forward. In the March 2014 issue of the American Bar Association Jour-
nal, for example, the president of the New York City Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Association described how easy it was for officers to articu-
late reasonable suspicion for a Terry frisk. “For instance,” he said,
“when you have a person who is carrying a weapon, they tend to be
heavy on one side. They’re nervous and repeatedly tap the area.”146
There was, not surprisingly, no substantiation for this statement. At the
February 2014 Symposium hosted by the University of Miami Law
Review, Judge John Gleeson referred to a similar statement made in his
courtroom by an officer who stopped and frisked a defendant based on
the distinctive way that the defendant stepped up onto a curb. That man-
ner of stepping onto a curb, the officer had read, indicated that the indi-
vidual was carrying a weapon in the waistband. And, sure enough, the
officer found a weapon on the defendant. When Judge Gleeson asked the
officer how many people who stepped onto a curb that particular way
actually had a weapon, the officer responded that he had conducted
something of an experiment to answer that exact question, counting the
number of people with the distinctive step who did and did not have a
weapon. Of the roughly fifty people that the officer stopped for taking
that distinctive step onto a curb, only one was armed.147
Questionable cop knowledge is not limited to identifying armed
individuals, of course. Similar assertions can be found in many different
areas of police training, and there are any number of beliefs that may not
bear the weight of serious scrutiny,148 from accurately identifying decep-
145. Paul Howe, Tactical Shooting: How to Find the Right Tactical Shooting System for Your
Agency, POLICEONE.COM (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/
articles/1204309-Tactical-Shooting-How-to-find-the-right-tactical-shooting-system-for-your-
agency/; Henry Lee, Agencies Investigate Blue-on-Blue Shootings in Wake of Tragedy,
POLICEONE.COM (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.policeone.com/investigations/articles/6770325-
Agencies-investigate-blue-on-blue-shootings-in-wake-of-tragedy/.
146. Stephanie Francis Ward, Stopping Stop and Frisk, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2014, at 38, 44,
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/has_stop_and_frisk_been_stopped/.
147. Hon. John Gleeson, University of Miami Law Review Symposium: Leading from Below:
Panel 3—Criminal Procedure in the Courtroom, U. MIAMI SCH. L. (Feb. 15, 2014), at 21:15–
23:15, http://www.law.miami.edu/webcast/video.php?location=departments&stream=201402_14-
15_UMLawReviewSymposium_Panel3.mp4&width=480&height=270&page=.
148. Shima Baradaran, for example, has called into question the long-standing assumptions,
made by both cops and courts, about the relationship between drugs and violence. Shima
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tion during an interrogation149 to predictably reducing the duration of
hostage situations.150 For police expert testimony, this presents a prob-
lem; we would not qualify a witness to testify as an expert based on
information he learned from Wikipedia, but in the policing context we
are more willing to tolerate information gleaned from the in-person
equivalent, what we might reasonably call Cop-ipedia. Worse yet, ques-
tionable information delivered as officer training can lead to the creation
of a series of self-fulfilling prophecies. When a police officer who has
been trained to look for someone tapping their waistband or stepping up
onto a curb in a specific way stops someone and finds a firearm, for
example, their training is validated by personal experience. When the
individual is not armed, however, the trained officer’s cognitive bias
kicks in;151 it becomes almost impossible for the officer to view the inci-
dent as a failure of the technique itself. Instead, the officer may conclude
that the individual is used to carrying a weapon and so exhibited the
same behavioral symptoms, or perhaps the officer will assume that he
(the officer) misinterpreted the individual’s behavior and so misapplied
a perfectly valid technique.
The criticism that police ignore the evaluative import of false posi-
tives is not new; the same observation has been made in the context of
interrogations152 (the Reid technique, the most popular law enforcement
interrogation method, claims that, properly used, it simply does not pro-
duce false confessions153), fingerprint identification154 (“the friction
ridge [analysis] community actively discourages its members from testi-
fying in [probabilistic] terms . . . ; when a latent print examiner testifies
that two [fingerprint] impressions ‘match,’ they are communicating the
notion that the prints could not possibly have come from two different
Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2414202.
149. See HARRIS, supra note 58, at 40–47; Gary I. Wilson, Perspective on Neurolinguistic
Programming (NLP), POLICE CHIEF, Dec. 2010, at 40, 40–51, available at http://www.nxtbook.
com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM1210/#/40.
150. See, e.g., THE TACTICAL EDGE, supra note 139, at 174 (“Some researchers claim that the
average barricading (with hostages) lasts about 12 hours. But with good psychological skills, you
usually can at least get the talk turned toward alterative solutions to the suspect’s problem within
one to three hours.”) (emphasis omitted).
151. For a thorough explanation of the multiple causes of cognitive bias in criminal justice, see
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 307–31 (2006).
152. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 40–47; CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 58, at 14–45.
153. See Interrogation, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., http://www.reid.com/educational_
info/criticinterrogation.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (addressing criticisms of various
interrogation methods and explaining how correctly using the Reid method can help to avoid false
or coerced confessions).
154. See CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 58, at 106–09; HARRIS, supra note 58, at
24–30.
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individuals”155), police canines,156 and other aspects of criminal investi-
gations.157 When viewed in the context of expert testimony, it is worth
remembering that an officer’s years of experience are shaped by and
viewed through the training that an officer receives—including the
good, the bad, and the ugly.
I cannot, I must confess, offer some elegant solution to the problem
of reliability in police training, an easy-to-apply rule that will guide
courts to admit officer opinion testimony only when it is grounded in a
reliable foundation. I will leave it to evidence scholars to draw more
precise lines in the murk that seems to swirl around Federal Rules of
Evidence 701 and 702. I, myself, think that in this area, as in other areas
of police regulation, courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys “must
still slosh [their] way through the factbound morass” of each individual
case.158 But that acknowledgement does not reduce the potential impact
of looking beyond the bare assertion of an officer’s years of service and
attendance in general or specialized training programs. By rejecting
opinion testimony based on unreliable or questionable training, courts
encourage police agencies to improve their training. While most individ-
ual officers are neither personally nor professionally vested in obtaining
convictions,159 evidentiary rulings can prompt police reform by leverag-
ing the commitment to professionalism that incentivizes law enforce-
ment officers and agencies to do things the “right” way. If an officer,
particularly one who has previously been accepted as an expert or who
hopes to testify as such in future cases, is told that his training is insuffi-
ciently reliable to support the opinion he seeks to offer, or if an agency
is informed by judges, prosecutors, or officers that they need to improve
the quality of their training so officers can retain the distinction of being
experts, the end effect may well be an improvement in officer training
that leads not just to more reliable testimony, but also to better policing.
IV. CHALLENGES TO POLICE REFORM THROUGH
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
The prior Part described how evidentiary rulings could help
improve modern policing, using the example of police lay and expert
155. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 141–42.
156. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (questioning the
“assumption that trained sniffing dogs do not err”). But see United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392,
395–96 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] very low percentage of false positives is not necessarily fatal to a
finding that the drug detection dog is properly trained and certified.”).
157. See Findley & Scott, supra note 151, at 296–307.
158. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (rejecting the general adoption of brightline
rules in the context of determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment).
159. Stoughton, supra note 2, at 876–82.
2015] EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AS POLICE REFORM 461
opinion testimony. I concluded optimistically, suggesting that police
agencies and officers could be responsive to evidentiary rulings in a way
that has the potential to meaningfully change police training, practices,
and culture. Despite the reasons for optimism, however, there are also
theoretical and practical challenges to reforming police through eviden-
tiary rulings. In this Part, I address those challenges.
A. Assumptions of Institutional Competence
The most obvious starting place for legal scholars may be the insti-
tutional objection: perhaps trial judges are well suited to make rulings in
individual cases, but provoking more systemic police reform is far
outside their ken. In short, my ambitions for police reform through evi-
dentiary rulings rest on two assumptions about the judicial role that
some legal thinkers find objectionable.160 First, that engaging in judi-
cially-driven police reform is a legitimate exercise of judicial authority;
and, second, that judges are capable of competently exercising what
authority they have to reform police agencies. Judges, so the argument
would go, should not be able to impose on law enforcement agencies
their own vision of acceptable police tactics—which are better left to the
executive agencies—or permissible police strategies—which are better
left to decisionmakers in the legislative branch. This is true for several
reasons, not least because judges are not in a position to manage the
implementation of the reforms they impose. Further, judges must be
careful not to undermine the adversarial system by effectively coopting a
160. I acknowledge at the outset the limitations of that phrasing, which intentionally abstracts
away from a wide literature encompassing a long history of contentious debates among scholars,
judges, and politicians about the propriety, or lack thereof, of judicial activism. No single footnote
can hope to encompass the many dimensions of these spirited debates, and I will not make any
attempt to do so here, but it would be inexcusable to not provide at least a few citations. For a
general background on the chimeric definition of “judicial activism,” see Kennan D. Kmiec, The
Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004). For
empirical work, see STEPHANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM (2009); Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2011). For a sense of the debate about the
relative costs and benefits of judicial activism, see Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial
Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-
Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (2012); J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society—Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968); Suzanna
Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism (Vanderbilt Public Law, Working Paper No. 13-3)
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2213372.
For a discussion of judicial activism by state supreme courts, see Peter J. Galie, The Other
Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731
(1982). For the political dynamics of judicial activism, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Selective Judicial
Activism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1423 (2011), as well as Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and
Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 COLO. L. REV. 1401 (2002), and other articles from
a 2002 University of Colorado Law Review Symposium entitled “Conservative Judicial
Activism.”
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defense attorney’s opportunity to challenge—or, for strategic reasons, to
not challenge—the qualification of a prosecution witness as an expert.161
I share many of the concerns that motivate such objections, but I do
not believe that they should control in this context. This proposal is not
about the direct regulation of police practices, but rather about the inci-
dental regulation of police practices through the mechanism of eviden-
tiary rulings.162 The role of trial court judges does not change; they
continue to make the same types of evidentiary determinations that they
have been entrusted for years to make. And, while I am sensitive to the
need to respect the adversarial system, the gatekeeping role that trial
courts must fulfill does and should permit a significant amount of discre-
tion for the judge to satisfy herself about the reliability of a putative
expert’s proffered opinions. My suggestion involves revising the level of
attention and detail that judges bring to bear when they make evidentiary
decisions that affect police, particularly those related to opinion testi-
mony, but the essence of my proposal is well within the legitimate func-
tion and core competency of trial court judges. Indeed, my argument is
that police agencies and officers are already responsive to evidentiary
rulings such that judges who improve the quality of their evidentiary
rulings may also improve the quality of police training, which in turn
has the potential to improve the quality of policing.
B. Lack of Information Sharing
When a judge does make an evidentiary ruling, law enforcement
agencies must have both access to the ruling itself and the inclination to
review the ruling before it can have any impact on police training or
behaviors.163 Unfortunately, it is rare for police departments to analyze
and incorporate information developed during litigation into institutional
decisionmaking, at least in the context of civil suits for police miscon-
duct.164 Police agencies, as a rule, are not attentive to the types of claims
that are filed, the evidence developed during litigation, or even the out-
comes of individual cases.165 Those departments that do monitor civil
litigation are often “stymied by technological glitches or human
161. For prosecutors and defense attorneys both, this can be a very real concern. Civil
procedure scholar Michael Morley was involved in a prosecution in which the judge asked
literally hundreds of questions directly to witnesses, inducing at least one to substantively change
their testimony. See Amended Appellant’s Brief at 12, Walker v. State, No. 1490 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2009).
162. See generally Stoughton, supra note 4.
163. STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT: HEARING THE
WORD (1976); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010).
164. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 1066–67.
165. Id. at 1057–59, 1066–67.
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error . . . . And other [agencies] appear to be sabotaged by those hiding
harmful information or maintaining the law enforcement ‘code of
silence.’”166 When this is true, there is unlikely to be any “connection
between lawsuits filed [against a police department] and the discipline,
supervision, and training of its officers.”167
Under existing practices, the situation may not be any better in the
context of suppression hearings or other aspects of criminal cases. Indi-
vidual officers are not commonly told that evidence that they or another
officer seized in relation to an arrest has been suppressed. If they are
told about the fact of suppression, they are unlikely to be told about
underlying reasons for suppression.168 And even when officers do have
some information about both the fact of and the reasons for suppression,
the general perception among law enforcement officers is that suppres-
sion is more attributable to failures in the legal system than it is to
officer actions.
A 2010 discussion in an Internet forum on the popular police web-
site Officer.com is demonstrative. A relatively inexperienced officer
opened a thread about a pending suppression hearing in an underage
possession of alcohol case, asking, “And if I do lose will this hurt my
reputation overall?”169 The first response is representative; it begins,
“Things get suppressed all the time, often due to legal wrangling that has
nothing to do with you or how you did the job.”170 Another user was
equally blunt, writing, “Welcome to the court system . . . you [sic] win
some, you lose some . . . often through no fault of your own.”171 Other
posters agreed, suggesting that there will be reputational damage only if
the officer lies under oath or if the stop that lead to the seizure was
blatantly illegal. In short, although the individual officer was advised to
treat suppression as a “learning experience,” no one expected suppres-
166. Id. at 1060.
167. Id. at 1048 (writing specifically about the Philadelphia Police Department). This
conclusion is not inevitable. In other work, Schwartz has described the potential for police
departments to gather litigation information that can be incorporated into policy and procedure
decisions. See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841
(2012).
168. Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REV. 211, 229–30 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the
Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY
L.J. 937, 953 (1983); see also Schwartz, supra note 163, at 1045–52.
169. Thin Blue Line, Ever Had Something Suppressed?, OFFICER.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 7:19
PM), http://forums.officer.com/t138969/.
170. SRT936, Comment to Ever Had Something Suppressed?, OFFICER.COM (Jan. 21, 2010,
7:26 PM), http://forums.officer.com/t138969/.
171. JLee, Comment to Ever Had Something Suppressed?, OFFICER.COM (Jan. 22, 2010, 3:02
AM), http://forums.officer.com/t138969/.
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sion to occasion any formal, let alone systemic, response.172
For evidentiary rulings to live up to their potential to affect officer
training and behavior, an information-forcing mechanism may prove
essential. I see three possibilities, all of which could complement each
other. First, a trial court judge could enter an order having the clerk of
the court forward to the appropriate party a copy of the opinion or, if
there is no written opinion, a copy of the transcript of the judge’s reason-
ing from the bench. I would think that sending a copy to the individual
officer would not prove terribly effective, but providing a copy to the
training division, a high-level supervisor in charge of operations, or an
internal affairs or quality assurance unit would be one way of providing
useful information to individuals with institutional interests.
Second, the prosecutor’s office could take the same tack; where
prosecutors now provide officers with very little information or even no
information at all about case dispositions,173 providing that information
not just to the officers themselves but to the relevant offices within the
police structure may motivate meaningful change. The prosecutorial
interest in obtaining convictions—which has led at least one office con-
cerned about evidentiary considerations to track police officers that
prosecutors “do not trust as witnesses in criminal trials”174—provides an
incentive for prosecutors to push for changes in training that courts
deem insufficiently reliable.
Finally, law enforcement agencies themselves could proactively
solicit information from courts and prosecutors. Some departments have
taken an active approach to gathering litigation information and incorpo-
rating that information into their decisionmaking processes,175 but none
that I am aware of have yet adopted policies that regularly gather infor-
172. Interestingly, several users observed that, even if the evidence was suppressed (and,
implicitly, the prosecution unsuccessful), the arresting officer should not consider it a loss because
the arrest itself had punished the suspect and served law enforcement goals. As one user put it,
“The person still took a ride, had to pay a lawyer etc and you probably got someone off the streets
for the night that should not have been driving after drinking.” Zeitgeist, Comment to Ever Had
Something Suppressed?, OFFICER.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 10:21 PM), http://forums.officer.com/
t138969/. Another user agreed, writing, “Even if [the prosecution] is tossed, the defendant is about
$5k into his attorney and you’re [getting paid] overtime.” Blatant, Comment to Ever Had
Something Suppressed?, OFFICER.COM (Jan. 22, 2010, 5:16 AM), http://forums.officer.com/
t138969/.
Scholars have long noted that arrest can be a tool to advance an interest other than criminal
conviction. See Stoughton, supra note 2, at 881–82; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION
TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 437 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965). It is uncommon to see
open acknowledgements that arrests and prosecutions can be punishment in themselves.
173. Stoughton, supra note 2, at 880–81.
174. Jeff McDonald, DA Keeps Secret List of Bad Cops, UT SAN DIEGO (July 26, 2014, 11:31
AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/jul/26/da-secret-brady-list-bad-cops/.
175. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 1052–71.
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mation from evidentiary rulings, let alone use that information to make
training decisions. Even given the limited nature of individual officers’
interest in obtaining convictions, the information-gathering function
could align with a department’s interest in demonstrating its commit-
ment to professionalism.
C. The Limited Opportunities for Police Reform
Even when police agencies do have access to information about
evidentiary rulings and are willing to incorporate that information into
their training regimens, it is important to note the limits of using eviden-
tiary considerations as a mechanism for police reform. After all, most of
what police actually do never makes it into court and therefore is not
subject to any evidentiary considerations. This observation can be
counterintuitive, especially for lawyers and legal scholars who, by virtue
of legal training grounded in judicial opinions and constitutional princi-
ples, are focused on litigation-driven reform. According to the 2008 data
collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, roughly 885,000 federal, state, and local officers made a
total of just over 14 million arrests,176 or approximately fifteen each that
year.177 With an average of just over one arrest every month, officers
clearly have to be spending most of their time doing something other
than arresting people. Some of that time is spent on investigations,178
traffic stops, detentions, frisks, searches, and other activities that impli-
cate constitutional, statutory, or common law concerns and so could con-
ceivably get into court in a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or one of
the various state law analogs, even though most interactions are not the
subject of any litigation whatsoever. But most of policing is not subject
to judicial review, including an officer’s decision to patrol a particular
neighborhood more or less heavily, to check only some of the businesses
on a street, to arrest some people but not others, to “unarrest” someone
in exchange for information, to interview some witnesses instead of
176. See Brian A. Reaves, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csllea08.pdf; Brian A. Reaves, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS,
2008 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf; Table 29, 2008 CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/
table_29.html (last updated Sept. 2009).
177. Obviously, this rough estimate should not be taken as accurate; one could reasonably
assert that local officers make far more arrests than their federal counterparts.
178. For an interesting study on the average number of hours needed for officers at one Florida
agency to close various types of investigations, see WILLIAM PRUMMELL, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL: INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.fdle.state.
fl.us/Content/getdoc/34d5daa2-28ca-4381-be9a-f2d084208e89/prummell-bill-final-paper-%281
%29.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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others, to credit some witnesses over others, to write a report in a partic-
ular way, et cetera. Formal manpower studies have found that most of
any given officer’s time is spent performing tasks that are extremely
unlikely to lead to any sort of litigation: performing administrative
actions, providing non-enforcement services, and the like.179 The oppor-
tunity to use evidentiary considerations to reform police training and
behavior is admittedly limited when the desired reform is unrelated to
criminal prosecution or civil litigation that officers may be involved
with. But this observation does not weaken the observation that impor-
tant aspects of police training and behavior—reasonable suspicion deter-
minations, the decision to use force and the choice of force options to
use, officer safety tactics, et cetera—are responsive to evidentiary
considerations.
A related concern involves the possibility of police gamesmanship.
Police officers have inarguably picked up on the fact that formulaic lan-
guage can often satisfy a court about the propriety or validity of a partic-
ular action. Judges have themselves noted the apparent ability of
officers, for example, to describe almost any given action as “suspi-
cious.”180 Officers have developed verbal templates, typically based on
case law, that they use and reuse not just in their own testimony, but also
in search and arrest warrant applications. When the template language
accurately conveys the facts and nuances of each individual case, there
is very little to object to; many attorneys do something similar in their
briefs and many judges do much the same in their opinions. There is
always the risk, however, that adopting a particular form of presentation
as reliable will “lead to the substitution of words for analysis.”181 To a
significant extent that has already happened in police testimony; recall
my criticism that courts tend to qualify officers as experts after a cursory
179. See, e.g., FIONA MCLEAN & JOE HILLIER, NPIA, AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY OF
RESPONSE AND NEIGHBOURHOOD OFFICERS (2011), available at http//whatworks.college.police.uk/
Research/Documents/An_observational_study_of_response_and_neighbourhood_officers.pdf#
search=fiona%20mclean; STEPHEN D. MASTROFSKI ET AL, POLICING NEIGHBORHOODS: A REPORT
FROM INDIANAPOLIS (1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/fs000223.txt; Roger B.
Parks et al., How Officers Spend Their Time with the Community, 16 JUST. Q. 483, 499 (1999);
John A Webster, Police Officers Spend Nearly Half Their Working Day on Paperwork and
Meetings, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 28, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12694
05/Police-officers-spend-nearly-half-working-day-paperwork-meetings.html.
180. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he officer testified
that he was additionally suspicious because when he drove by Broomfield in his squad car before
turning around and getting out and accosting him he noticed that Broomfield was ‘star[ing]
straight ahead.’ Had Broomfield instead glanced around him, the officer would doubtless have
testified that Broomfield seemed nervous or, the preferred term because of its vagueness, ‘furtive.’
Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described
by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you.”).
181. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court’s application of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis).
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recitation of their years of service, assignments, and training.182
Nor is bland recounting of an officer’s tenure and training the only
example of form over substance. Another common example is the use of
the phrase “furtive movements,” often offered as support for an investi-
gatory stop or frisk. By using that particular phrase, officers may be
obscuring, rather than describing, the actions that gave rise to their sus-
picion. “Furtive” literally means “[a]ttempting to avoid notice or atten-
tion” or “suggestive of guilty nervousness.”183 In police circles,
“furtive” has taken on a different meaning; well-known lethal force
trainer Massad Ayoob described “a furtive movement” as “a movement
reasonably consistent with going for a weapon and not reasonably con-
sistent with anything else under the circumstances.”184 Regardless of
which definition officers are trying to employ, it remains, as Judge Shira
Scheindlin observed in her remarks at the Symposium, a “vague or sub-
jective” standard on which to base an investigatory detention.185 Without
additional explanation, the phrase does not provide meaningful informa-
tion that could be used to weigh the reasonableness of a particular stop
or frisk.
Similarly, the use of the phrase “high crime area”—another phrase
commonly used to support the reasonableness of a particular police
action—has multiple dimensions of vagueness. It fails to provide any
meaningful description of the relevant “area.” It could mean a particular
intersection, neighborhood, or, as Judge Scheindlin suggested, describ-
ing the testimony of an officer in her courtroom, “The entire borough of
Brooklyn.”186 Further, it fails to distinguish “high crime” areas from
areas with only moderate crime, or seasonal crime, or crime that, while
frequent, is limited to a small set of criminal offenses. Without that
information, the description of a particular place as a “high crime area”
is manifestly empty of meaning. The same criticism applies to the non-
descriptive identification of any given action as “suspicious.” As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted, “Whether
you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you
will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish
to stop or arrest you.”187 Officers commonly refer to their “training and
experience” to provide some substance for their description of some-
182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
183. OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_eng
lish/furtive (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
184. Massad Ayoob, Skulking in the Vestibule, GUNS MAG., Jul. 1, 2000.
185. Shira A. Scheindlin, Judicial Fact-Finding and the Trial Court Judge, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 367 (2015).
186. Id.
187. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
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thing as furtive or suspicious and for their identification of a high crime
area, but that foundation has become as vacuous a concept as “furtive,”
“suspicious,” and “high crime area” themselves. The possibility, even
the probability, of officers adopting formulaic language as a method of
satisfying the court’s determination of expertise is a very real one, but
one that can only be addressed with what Harry Potter fans might call
“constant vigilance!”188
V. CONCLUSION
This article is an entry in the ongoing conversation about going
beyond the exclusionary rule and the threat of civil liability in the search
for legal mechanisms that will promote police reform. In it, I argued that
law enforcement agencies are responsive to evidentiary considerations
such that a trial court judge’s evidence ruling, where properly communi-
cated, has the potential to affect officer training that shapes police cul-
ture. There are limitations, some obvious and some less so, but those
limitations do not obviate the possibility of using evidentiary rulings to
affect important aspects of policing.
188. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 213 (2000). Many readers will
misattribute this quote to Alastor “Mad Eye” Moody; close readers will properly attribute this
quote to Bartemius “Barty” Couch, Jr., who repeated it on multiple occasions while using
polyjuice to disguise himself as Mad Eye Moody. I leave it to the reader to determine for
themselves the propriety of urging judges to follow the advice of a Deatheater disguised as a
paranoid ex-Auror.
